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ARTICLE
Environmental Justice in India: The National
Green Tribunal and Expert Members
Gitanjali Nain Gill*
Abstract
This article argues that the involvement of technical experts in decision making promotes
better environmental results while simultaneously recognizing the uncertainty in
science. India’s record as a progressive jurisdiction in environmental matters
through its proactive judiciary is internationally recognized. The neoteric National Green
Tribunal of India (NGT) – ofﬁcially described as a ‘specialised body equipped with
necessary expertise to handle environmental disputes involving multi-disciplinary
issues’ – is a forum which offers greater plurality for environmental justice. The NGT, in
exercising wide powers, is staffed by judicial and technical expert members who decide
cases in an open forum. The experts are ‘central’, rather than ‘marginal’, to the NGT’s
decision-making process.
This article draws on theoretical insights developed by Lorna Schreﬂer and Peter Haas to
analyze the role of scientiﬁc experts as decision makers within the NGT. Unprecedented
interview access provides data that grants an insight into the internal decision-making
processes of the ﬁve benches of the NGT. Reported cases, supported by additional
comments of bench members, illustrate the wider policy impact of scientiﬁc knowledge
and its contribution to the NGT’s decision-making process.
Keywords: Environmental decision making, India, National Green Tribunal India,
Expert technical members, Knowledge utilization
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1. introduction
This article accepts that environmental problems are complex and increasingly
transnational in nature. It argues, on the basis of ﬁeldwork data gathered in
India, that the involvement of technical experts at the heart of courtroom decision
making promotes better environmental results. The importance of experts is
recognized in the view that ‘experts deﬁne the regime of truth; they tell us what the
world looks like, identify and quantify relevant variables, provide statistical
measurements and risk analyses, and solve the equations that indicate the
path towards increasing the aggregate level of well-being … Experts deﬁne the
system’.1
There is academic literature that defends the involvement of experts on the ground
of their contribution to decision making.2 Environmental decision making may
involve science;3 consequently, scientiﬁc expertise can provide appropriate solutions
to technical or complicated environmental problems. Effective environmental
governance calls for procedural values such as transparency, inclusion, deliberation
and participation, which involve the input of experts, while at the same time offering
collective and effective problem-solving solutions. These procedural values are
perceived as integral to legitimating the processes and the institution seeking to
impart environmental justice.
The prototypical expert decision maker plays a fundamental role in advancing the
values and goals of institutions, organizations and legislation by offering expert
knowledge. This function is widely supported, though it remains unsettled and
debated. For instance, the gap between the production and use of expert knowledge
has posed concerns about the extent of expert involvement and accountability in the
1 J. Lawrence, ‘The Structural Logic of Expert Participation in WTO Decision-Making Processes’,
in M. Ambrus et al. (eds), The Role of ‘Experts’ in International and European Decision-Making
Processes: Advisors, Decision Makers or Irrelevant Actors? (Cambridge University Press, 2014),
pp. 173–93, at 186.
2 Ambrus et al., ibid.; K.A. Ericsson et al. (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise
and Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006); A. Kronsell & K. Bäckstrand, ‘Ration-
alities and Forms of Governance: A Framework for Analysing the Legitimacy of New Modes of
Governance’, in K. Bäckstrand et al. (eds), Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy:
Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance (Edward Elgar, 2010), pp. 28–43,
at 38–9; A. Buchanan & R.O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’ (2006)
20(4) Ethics and International Affairs, pp. 405–38; J. Steffek, ‘The Legitimation of International
Environmental Governance’ (2003) 9(2) European Journal of International Relations,
pp. 249–76.
3 In environmental regimes, the use of science and scientiﬁc expertise playing a role as problem identiﬁers
and problem solvers is well documented: see, generally, T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolution
(University of Chicago Press, 1970); S. Andresen et al. (eds), Science and Politics in International
Environmental Regimes: Between Integrity and Involvement (Manchester University Press, 2000);
A. Gupta et al., ‘Science Networks’, in F. Biermann & P. Pattberg (eds), Global Environmental
Governance Reconsidered (The MIT Press, 2012), pp. 69–95; G. Shaffer, ‘Risk, Science and Law in the
WTO: The Centrality of Institutional Choice’, in Proceedings of the 104th Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, 24–27 Mar. 2010, p. 19; R. Feldman, The Role of Science in Law
(Oxford University Press, 2009); A. Green & T. Epps, ‘The WTO, Science and the Environment:
Moving Towards Consistency’ (2007) 10(2) Journal of International Economic Law, pp. 285–316, at
302–7.
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environmental decision-making process.4 Issues including identiﬁcation and selection
of an expert, homogenous or heterogeneous groups of experts, collegial and
collaborative decision making, knowledge application and input to policy decisions
challenge the legitimization and scientiﬁcation of environmental decision making
through experts and their expertise.
India’s record as a progressive jurisdiction in environmental matters through its
proactive judiciary is internationally recognized.5 The neoteric National Green
Tribunal of India (NGT or Tribunal) – ofﬁcially described as a ‘specialised body
equipped with necessary expertise to handle environmental disputes involving
multi-disciplinary issues’6 – is a forum that offers greater plurality for environmental
justice. The NGT exercises wide powers and is staffed by judicial and technical expert
members who decide cases in an open forum. It avails itself of adversarial,
inquisitorial, investigative and collaborative procedures throughout the decision-
making process.7
This article focuses on the role of experts and their expertise within the NGT,
acting as decision makers in environmental disputes. The experts are ‘central’, rather
than ‘marginal’, to the NGT’s normative structure. For the purpose of this article, the
terms ‘expert’ and ‘expertise’ do not include judicial members but refer speciﬁcally to
the technical members having a range of specialized scientiﬁc knowledge, which
includes environmental sciences, environmental studies, environmental engineering,
technology, ecology, forestry, plant sciences, soil sciences, zoology and related
categories. Experienced scientists, practising ecologists and natural resource
managers are considered as experts.8 Thus, scientiﬁc expertise and its input into
the decision-making process is vital for the character, decisions and working practices
of the NGT.
Hereafter, the article is divided into six sections. The ﬁrst (Section 2) presents the
methodology, followed by a brief review in Section 3 of the science and its reliability,
along with the value of expert testimony. Section 4 offers the theoretical framework
encompassing epistemic communities and knowledge utilization. The following
section offers an account of the genesis, establishment and statutory powers of the
NGT, and Section 6 tests the theoretical framework by applying it to the NGT in the
light of ﬁeldwork data. Relevant, illustrative case law is also considered. The
concluding section reviews the relationship of the NGT with other powerful
environmental bodies and questions the future of the NGT.
4 See, e.g., C.H. Weiss, ‘The Many Meanings of Research Utilization’ (1979) 39(5) Public Administration
Review, pp. 426–31; E.A. Lindquist, ‘What Do Decision Models Tell Us About Information Use?’
(1988) 1(2) Knowledge, Technology and Policy, pp. 86–111.
5 G.L. Peiris, ‘Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent: Current Dimensions’ (1991) 40(1)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 66–90. See also M.R. Anderson, ‘Individual Rights
to Environmental Protection in India’, in A.E. Boyle & M.R. Anderson (eds), Human Rights
Approaches to Environmental Protection (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 1–23.
6 See the NGT website at: http://greentribunal.gov.in.
7 V.G. Bhungase v. Gangakhed Sugar and Energy Ltd, NGT Judgment, 20 Dec. 2013.
8 M. Drescher et al., ‘Towards Rigorous Use of Expert Knowledge in Ecological Research’ (2013) 4(7)
Ecosphere, pp. 1–26, at 2.
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2. methodology
This article builds upon and examines ﬁeldwork data collected in India in 2014 and
2015. Speciﬁcally, it focuses on the involvement of the scientiﬁc bench members
and their expertise in the decision-making process. I was afforded unique academic
access to interview all NGT bench members. The Indian judiciary, working within a
common law jurisdiction, remains particularly sensitive about its independence from
politics and the integrity of its internal decision-making processes. In the United
Kingdom (UK) the judiciary has become more ‘open’ to academic enquiry.9 The
Chairman of the NGT granted me permission to approach members of the regional
benches as well as the principal bench in Delhi. Initial access was organized by the
principal registrar in Delhi. Thereafter, regional registrars organized meetings with
bench members in Pune, Bhopal, Chennai and Kolkata. The interviews were
conducted in chambers during July and August 2014 and March and April 2015.
Expert members and judicial members were interviewed. The Chairperson of the
NGT was interviewed in Delhi. In total 110 interviews were undertaken. The
interviewees included lawyers, litigants and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
with the aim of establishing both internal and external evaluations of the NGT. All
interviews were semi-structured, followed the same set of questions, were recorded
and subsequently transcribed. Individual permission to use all recorded material was
obtained. I also observed cases before the ﬁve NGT benches.
My empirical Indian ﬁeldwork (observations, recorded interviews and reported
judgments) demonstrates the value of judge-scientists and their role in contributing to
the NGT’s decisions through an interdisciplinary approach – an approach that focuses
on reaching the best available solution rather than being limited to predetermined
traditional legal remedies. Further, the work shows the visible impact of collective
decision making between judge-lawyers and judge-scientists in the formulation and
implementation of policy development, as is illustrated by the selected NGT judgments
reviewed in this article. In India judicial activism is of particular importance as it is a
response to the limited effectiveness of both political leadership and administrative
authorities in discharging their constitutional and administrative duties.10
3. questionable science and expert testimony
The involvement of experts and expert knowledge in policy and decision making
commands an important place in academic discourse. Nevertheless, the relationship of
science and politics is and remains problematic, and is subject to widespread debate.11
9 A. Paterson, The Law Lords (Palgrave Macmillan, 1982); A. Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law
Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart, 2013); H. Annison, ‘Interpreting the Politics of the
Judiciary: The British Senior Judicial Tradition and the Pre-emptive Turn in Criminal Law’ (2014)
41(3) Journal of Law and Society, pp. 339–66.
10 G.N. Gill, ‘Human Rights and the Environment in India: Access through Public Interest Litigation’
(2012) 14(3) Environmental Law Review, pp. 199–217, at 200.
11 See, generally, C. Limoges, ‘Expert Knowledge and Decision-Making in Controversy Contexts’ (1993)
2(4) Public Understanding in Science, pp. 417–26; N. Oreskes & E. Conway, Merchants of Doubt:
How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming
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Sectional interests, including government, industry and commercial capital, may
underwrite or promote research to serve their particular interests.12 Indeed, a simple
reliance on science for explanations or for development has had its own pitfalls, as was
illustrated by the fatal technical design ﬂaws of Comet passenger planes, the technically
debated responses to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad-cow disease),
and the Cumbrian sheep farmers’ challenges to the responses of the government’s
scientiﬁc advisers to the Chernobyl contamination of their land.13 Additionally, science
may be captured by politicians, as was experienced in the former USSR by Stalin and
his catastrophic farming policy or the government response to the AIDS crisis in South
Africa.14 A consequence is that the objectivity of science is now questionable as policy
issues are discussed and resolved. Objection to the neutrality of science is reﬂected in
the view that it is rooted in wider social, political and economic contexts. What is
clear is that the research on expert roles is mostly theoretical. While theories are
well developed, there is only limited empirical evidence to support these changes
and procedures.15
However, the introduction of scientiﬁc determinants, as presented by experts, into
legal rationality, as exercised by the judiciary, raises the question of the role and limits
of judicial creativity. Should the judiciary be acknowledged as authorized to exercise
such expansive powers? If yes, the question arises of whether judges are ﬁt for
purpose? Seldom are judges scientiﬁcally trained; therefore, they may be ill-informed
assessors of the claims of paid or retained scientiﬁc experts who enter court offering
fact-based evidence on behalf of a party to the case.16 It has been suggested that
inadequately trained judicial ‘gatekeepers’ lay themselves open to be overwhelmed by
(Bloomsbury, 2010); P. Spruijt et al., ‘Roles of Scientists as Policy Advisers on Complex Issues:
A Literature Review’ (2014) 40 Environmental Science and Policy, pp. 16–25.
12 See, generally, Council for Tobacco Research (US), funded by Philip Morris; L.I. Lesser et al.,
‘Relationship between Funding Source and Conclusion among Nutrition-Related Scientiﬁc Articles’
(2007) 4 Public Library of Science Medicine, pp. 41–6; M. Maclean, ‘The Impact of Socio Legal
Studies on Family Justice: From Oxford to Whitehall’ (2015) Journal of Law and Society (forth-
coming); T.O. McGarity, ‘Our Science is Sound Science and Their Science is Junk Science: Science
Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and
Activities’ (2004) 52 Kansas Law Review, pp. 897–937; H. Collins & R. Evans, Rethinking Expertise
(The University of Chicago Press, 2007); S. Jasanoff, ‘Quality Control and Peer Review in Advisory
Science’, in J. Lentsch & P. Weingart (eds), The Politics of Scientiﬁc Advice Institutional Design for
Quality Assurance (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 19–35.
13 See, e.g., H. Collins, Are We All Scientiﬁc Experts Now? (Polity, 2014), pp. 4, 40.
14 Ibid., pp. 41–3.
15 As early as 1945 this was pointed out by R.K. Merton, ‘Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy’
(1945) 23(4) Social Forces, pp. 405–15; see also Spruijt et al., n. 11 above, pp. 16–25.
16 W. Twining, ‘Preparing Lawyers for the Twenty First Century’ (1992) 3(1) Legal Education Review,
pp. 1–16, at 14 (‘In my experience most lawyers are innumerate and most law students are terriﬁed of
ﬁgures’); D.L. Faigmann, Legal Alchemy: The Use and Misuse of Science in the Law (W.H. Freeman
and Co., 1999); Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment,
20 Apr. 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), in particular the dissenting and separate opinions of Judges
Al-Khasawneh, Simma, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, and Vinuesa regarding the role of experts. To quote
from the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma (ibid., para. 3): ‘The Court has
had before it a case on international environmental law of an exemplary nature, a ‘textbook example’,
so to speak, of alleged trans-frontier pollution; yet, the Court has approached it in a way that will
increase doubts in the international legal community whether it, as an institution, is well placed to
tackle complex scientiﬁc questions’.
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junk science. The common law courtroom is the forum for adversarial advocacy,
which sometimes involves the participation of numerous expert witnesses advancing
differing and competitive scientiﬁc evidence. An outcome can be a battle of scientiﬁc
opinions where strongly held positions are debated and further tested, deconstructed
and challenged.17 The court may be particularly vulnerable where one ﬁnancially
strong party can advance a parade of scientiﬁc experts.18 The courts are aware of the
dangers of unproven science, as explained by Lord Phillips in Sienkiewicz v. Greif UK
Ltd,19 in which the court recognized that scientiﬁc evidence may have limitations:
‘epidemiological data may not be reliable’ as science is still ignorant ‘of how
causation in fact occurs … There is a real danger that so-called “epidemiological
evidence” will carry a false air of authority’.20 A potential consequence is that
courtroom truth and legal rationality can be affected or replaced by questionable,
biased or ‘purchased’ scientiﬁc knowledge.21
This article does not address the challenging issues within the sociology of
knowledge, which include the multiple roles of experts vis-à-vis policy creation and its
promotion. The relationship of science and policy has generated a body of lively and
disparate opinion and literature beyond the limited scope of this article. Nor does the
article consider the relationship or functionality of the expert witness introduced into
the courtroom in order to promote the case of a litigant. The article accepts that there
may be several, alternative or competing scientiﬁcally based solutions to a problem
rather than stating there is a solitary solution: ‘the solution’. These may be advanced
to the court by retained expert witnesses or scientiﬁcally based evidence may be
generated within the court by its ‘in house’ scientiﬁc experts. Thus there is both
‘ﬂexibility’ and ‘uncertainty’ in science.
This article traces and evaluates the way in which, by an Act of Parliament in
India, a symbiotic relationship has been created between legal and scientiﬁc experts
operating as joint decision makers and adjudicators of environmental conﬂicts within
the context of a nationally functioning tribunal. The courtroom is a place of dispute
resolution. It is not a ‘maybe-discussion’ forum where policy is debated or negotiated
among interested and sometimes powerful interest groups. The consequence of its
statutory establishment and function is that there are always decisions that declare
formal winners and losers.
Any potential discord within the courtroom between science and law has been
addressed by the NGT through its appointment procedures, its choice of scientiﬁc
experts, and its public and private decision-making processes. This article considers
17 See, e.g., S. Bocking, ‘Scientiﬁc Expertise and Environmental Politics: Cross-Border Contrasts’,
Conference Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association, York University, Toronto
(Canada), 2006.
18 P.W. Huber, Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in the Court Room (Basic Books, 1991).
19 [2011] 2 AC 229.
20 Ibid., pp. 261, 290.
21 S. Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Harvard University Press, 1995); S. Jasanoff, ‘Just Evidence: The Limits
of Science in the Legal Process’ (2006) 34(2) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, pp. 328–41;
S.L. Cooper, ‘The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses to Developments in
Forensic Science’ (2013) 33(1) Pace Law Review, pp. 234–301.
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the efforts of the NGT to reach good decisions that involve and reﬂect ‘good science’
by centralizing scientiﬁc experts, as full court members, within the decision-making
process, thereby promoting a collective, decision-making, symbiotic, interdisciplinary
bench that seeks to harmonize legal norms with scientiﬁc knowledge.
4. theoretical framework – epistemic communities and
knowledge utilization
Political science scholarship offers an analytical tool which can be applied to the NGT
in order to unwrap and review the data presented in this article. Thus, there is here a
transmigration of theory and its application from one discipline to another social
science: political science to law.
The concept of ‘epistemic communities’ is usually applied by political scientists for
a ‘clearer theory of state’ and for ‘formulating interest and reconciling differences of
interest’.22 Peter Haas describes distinctive features of ‘epistemic communities’ as:
networks … often transnational – of knowledge-based experts with an authoritative
claim to policy relevant knowledge within their domain of expertise. Their members
share knowledge about the causation of … phenomena … and a common set of nor-
mative beliefs about what actions will beneﬁt human welfare in such a domain. Members
are experts with professional training who enjoy social authority based on their repu-
tation for impartial expertise.23
The validation of the ‘epistemic communities’ claims of expertise and impartiality are
judged by external social standards such as ‘peer review, non-political appointment
based on merits to authoritative panels, track record, publications and training’.24
The engagement of the NGT’s scientiﬁc experts in the decision-making process is
akin to Peter Haas’s concept of ‘epistemic communities’ operating within an
environmental regime. It is suggested that the involvement of experts as ‘constructive
science scholars’ in environmental decision making is subject to similar analysis.
Further, it is suggested by Lorna Schreﬂer that interactive scientiﬁc expert
involvement increases structural output in an institution, governance or political
order.25 She argues that expert knowledge and expertise play a key role in the
successful functioning and credibility of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs)
based on the premise of ‘technical policy makers operating in isolation from political
factors’. Schreﬂer states: ‘IRAs are considered as central producers and users of policy
relevant knowledge. In-house expertise is often a core feature of their
independence’.26 The use of scientiﬁc knowledge provides legitimacy in output via
22 P.M. Haas, ‘Ideas, Experts and Governance’, in Ambrus et al., n. 1 above, pp. 19–43, at 30.
23 P.M. Haas, ‘Epistemic Communities’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunée & E. Hey (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 791–806, at 793.
24 Haas, n. 22 above, p. 30, n. 22.
25 L. Schreﬂer, ‘The Usage of Scientiﬁc Knowledge by Independent Regulatory Agencies’ (2010) 23(2)
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, pp. 309–30;
L. Schreﬂer, ‘Reﬂections on the Different Roles of Expertise in Regulatory Policy Making’, in Ambrus
et al., n. 1 above, pp. 63–81.
26 Ibid., ‘Reﬂections on the Different Roles’, p. 65.
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this expertise coupled with the requirement to publish reasons to justify their
regulatory decisions.
Upon reviewing the academic literature on the importance and use of expertise
by policy makers, Schreﬂer constructs three principal approaches to knowledge
utilization: instrumental, strategic and symbolic. The rationale underpinning
these approaches is based on the use of expertise provided that the ‘experts are
the fabric from which the organization is cut’.27 These approaches are hereafter
applied and tested through the data acquired in respect of the NGT and its expert
members.
The symbolic usage, often referred to as the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and
decoupled from policy decisions, aims to gain legitimacy and strengthen the agency’s
reputation as a credible player in the policy arena and conforming to external
expectations and pressures.
The instrumental use of knowledge is associated with the agency that identiﬁes the
best solution for the issue at stake. The problem-solving approach lies in an agency’s
need to perform its mandate and deliver outputs in line with the goals it has assigned
itself or received from the political principals. The problem-solving abilities can be
chosen to tackle ‘speciﬁc policy issues in [the] short term, but also to cope with future
problems by accumulating relevant expertise’.28
The third type of knowledge utilization is strategic in nature and is subdivided into
two categories: political and substantiating. The strategic political usage, as Weiss
deﬁnes it, is ‘tactical use of knowledge’,29 which expands the powers and resources of
the regulatory agency in order to convince the ‘political principals to review/extend
the agency’s mandate’.30 The strategic substantiating approach involves well-crafted
scientiﬁc knowledge which justiﬁes and supports a predetermined or preferred policy
solution. It can also serve as ‘ammunition in an adversarial context’.31
Expert knowledge may be employed in different ways and it does not require each
IRA to routinely adopt an identical approach to scientiﬁc knowledge. Schreﬂer
recognizes that empirical testing of different approaches to knowledge utilization is
currently limited as ‘it is relatively difﬁcult to operationalize and measure expert
knowledge utilization variables and, more broadly, to distinguish the inﬂuence of
expertise from other factors affecting policy decisions’.32 Variables such as availability
of adequate human and ﬁnancial resources, the level of disagreement over policy values
and goals between the actors involved in the policy environment, the power
distribution between the agency and its principal(s); pressures from different
categories of stakeholder are likely to affect the production and use of scientiﬁc
knowledge by IRAs. To overcome this limitation, Schreﬂer suggests ‘employing
qualitative methods as process tracing and case studies’ in order to better understand
27 Lawrence, n. 1 above, p. 193.
28 Schreﬂer, ‘Reﬂections on the Different Roles’, n. 25 above, p. 69.
29 Weiss, n. 4 above, p. 429.
30 Schreﬂer, ‘Reﬂections on the Different Roles’, n. 25 above, p. 70.
31 Schreﬂer, ‘The Usage of Scientiﬁc Knowledge, n. 25 above, p. 315.
32 Schreﬂer, ‘Reﬂections on the Different Roles’, n. 25 above, p. 71.
8 Transnational Environmental Law
the conditions that lead to different uses of knowledge utilization in policy making,
which could be relevant for experts inside and outside a regulatory agency.
The creation of IRAs offers structures to allow the utilization of expert knowledge
and IRAs can thereby perform their functions in an impartial and neutral manner.
However, this assumption, according to Schreﬂer, is difﬁcult to defend as a simple use
of technical power inevitably results in political consequences. To quote, ‘regulatory
policy making is better depicted as a continuum ranging from “government of
experts” to “government by politicians”. We have to accept that a portion of
regulatory policy making is political’.33 In order to ensure that the use and production
of expertise are legitimate, Schreﬂer concurs with Vibert’s claim for ‘an independent
but accountable locus for policy making’ embedded in ‘an effective procedural and
organizational set up’.34
Although Schreﬂer’s work focuses on IRAs, the superimposition of her theoretical
analysis of experts onto the NGT produces credible evidence that supports her
analytical framework. Like IRAs, the NGT is a creation of statutory legislation and
its constitution and powers are set out in the National Green Tribunal Act 2010,35
which also guarantees its independence from political interference or control.
Accountability is achieved by a series of established procedures and appeals,
operational both in courts of law and in the Tribunal. The decisions of the NGT are
not subject to judicial review as are IRAs, but they are subject to review by appeal, to
the Supreme Court. Further, the proceedings of the NGT take place in open court,
reﬂecting commonly accepted established rules and procedures. Judgments and
associated reasons are also given in open court. Thereafter the decisions and their
rationale are available for media and public scrutiny as they are published on the
internet as case reports.36 As in Schreﬂer’s work, the presence of the expert who is fully
integrated, accepted and operational within the institution is recognized as a key and
unique factor contributing to the ultimate decision – now a legal decision rather than the
creation of a policy. Consequently, this article proceeds to apply her analysis to
the ﬁeldwork undertaken at the NGT with special reference being paid to the scientiﬁc
experts sitting alongside lawyer judges, which allows them to input their scientiﬁc
knowledge and contribute as equal partners to the decision-making process.
The legitimacy of the NGT’s environmental decision making rests in part upon its
inclusive and participatory in-house, scientiﬁc expertise – it being an important
feature within the decision-making process. The interface between science and law is
particularly visible in the case of the NGT, where the scientiﬁc experts with
environmental knowledge work alongside legally qualiﬁed judges as collective
environmental decision makers of homologous standing.
In this context, I advance my empirical Indian ﬁeldwork to analyze the NGT’s
scientiﬁc ‘epistemic community’ and its practical application.
33 Ibid., p. 76.
34 Ibid.
35 The National Green Tribunal Act 2010, the Gazette of India Extraordinary (No. 19 of 2010).
36 NGT website, n. 6 above.
Gitanjali Gill 9
5. the national green tribunal of india
5.1. The Provenance
The role of India’s judiciary in securing the enforcement of rights outside statute
law but within the constitutional mandate promoted public interest litigation (PIL)
in the 1980s.37 PIL is a broad-based, people-orientated approach, which promotes
access to justice through judge-made processes and remedies. PIL revolutionized the
judicial procedure by introducing three procedural innovations: (i) expanded standing;
(ii) non-adversarial procedure; and (iii) wider remedial action as a result of expanded
frontiers of fundamental rights,38 particularly the right to life under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.39 Environmental PIL is a product of the courts’ response to
inaction by the state or the wrongful action of state agencies in performing their
statutory duties, which has resulted in endangering or impairing the quality of life of
people as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.40 The state is under a
duty to enforce this constitutional right by devising and implementing a coherent and
coordinated programme for the well-being of the population. Failure on the part of the
state prompted judges to issue brief interim directions entitled ‘continuing mandamus’.
In this context, PIL is considered a ‘wheel of transformation’ providing access to justice,
inter alia, to victims of environmental degradation. In the past two decades courts have
locked together human rights and the environment and entertained PIL petitions from
various quarters seeking remedies, including the issuing of guidelines and directions in
the absence of legislation.41 The proactive judiciary, acting as ‘amicus environment’, has
produced a major shift in the environmental landscape of India and has also declared
and promoted the principles of sustainable development and the precautionary and the
polluter pays principles as elements of fundamental law.42
The active engagement of the Indian judiciary in imparting environmental justice
nonetheless raised concerns about the effectiveness of PIL. This was in relation to the
rapidly increasing number of petitions, complex technical and scientiﬁc issues,
unrealistic court directions, and individual judicial preferences – often personality
driven rather than reﬂecting collective institutionalized adjudication – as well as the
37 ‘Report on the National Juridicare: Equal Justice – Social Justice’, Indian Ministry of Law, Justice and
Company Affairs (1977).
38 Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298; Fertilizer
Corporation Kamagar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan
Kumar (1976) 1 SCC 671; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dasholkar (1976) 1 SCR 306.
39 Art. 21 of the Constitution of India states: ‘No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law’.
40 S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 210; M.G. Faure & A.V. Raja, ‘Effectiveness of Environmental Public Interest Litigation in
India: Determining the Key Variable’ (2010) 21(2) Fordham Environmental Law Review, pp. 239–94.
41 L. Rajamani, ‘Public Interest Litigation in India: Exploring Issues of Access, Participation, Equity,
Effectiveness and Sustainability’ (2007) 19(3) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 293–321, at 295–6;
Gill, n. 10 above.
42 G. Sahu, ‘Implications of Indian Supreme Courts Innovation for Environmental Jurisprudence’ (2008)
4(1) Law, Environment and Development Journal, pp. 3–19, at 12–3; Vellore Citizen Welfare Forum
v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2715; A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Professor M.V. Nayudu,
AIR 1999 SC 812; Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3751.
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issue of creeping jurisdiction.43 Although the Supreme Court created a procedure that
allowed indigents and concerned citizens to access the courts via PIL, it did not prove
to be the much heralded ‘magic bullet’.44
In particular, the Supreme Court of India was concerned with the complexity and
uncertainty that underpinned scientiﬁc evidence presented to the court.45 Such
externally generated evidence created tensions, in fears expressed by claimants and
assurances given by the defendants. There was judicial concern about its ability to
evaluate and incorporate this scientiﬁc input in complex environmental cases.
Uncertainty becomes a problem when scientiﬁc knowledge, claims and counterclaims
are institutionalized into policy making as a basis for decision making by the court.
Scientists may reﬁne, modify or discard variables or models as more information
becomes available. However, agencies and courts must make choices based on
existing scientiﬁc knowledge. In addition, evidence generally presented in a scientiﬁc
form may prove to be difﬁcult to test or refute. Therefore, inadequacies in the record
arising out of uncertainty or insufﬁcient knowledge may not be properly
acknowledged or considered.46
The Supreme Court of India, in three important judgments, advocated the
establishment of environmental courts. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,47 Indian
Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India,48 and A.P. Pollution Control
Board v. Professor M.V. Nayudu,49 the Supreme Court observed that as
environmental cases frequently involve assessment of scientiﬁc data, it was
desirable to set up environmental courts on a regional basis with a legally
qualiﬁed judge and two experts, to undertake relevant adjudication as part of a
faster judicial process. It was suggested that the Law Commission of India examine
this matter.
The Law Commission of India, in its 186th Report on the Proposal to Constitute
Environment Courts (2003), recommended the establishment of environmental
courts. This recommendation was based on a review of the technical and scientiﬁc
problems that arose before the courts and the inadequacy of judicial knowledge on
the scientiﬁc and technical aspects of environmental issues. The Commission was
minded that, in seeking a balanced decision in such cases, ‘environmental courts’
with scientiﬁc as well as legal inputs would be better placed to reach a determination.
43 U. Baxi, ‘How Not to Judge the Judges: Notes towards Evaluation of the Judicial Role’ (1983) 25
Journal of the Indian Law Institute, pp. 211–37, at 211; B.N. Srikrishna, ‘Judicial Activism: Judges as
Social Engineers, Skinning a Cat’ (2005) 8 SCC (J), pp. 1–17, at 3; G. Sahu, ‘Implementation of
Environmental Judgments in Context: A Comparative Analysis of Dahanu Thermal Power Plant
Pollution Case in Maharashtra and Vellore Leather Industrial Pollution Case in Tamil Nadu’ (2010)
6(3) Law, Environment and Development Journal, pp. 337–52, at 345.
44 Gill, n. 10 above, p. 202.
45 A.P. Pollution Control Board v. M.V. Nayudu 1999(2) SCC 718 and 2001(2) SCC 62.
46 C. Barton, ‘The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia’ (1998) 22 Harvard Environmental
Law Review, pp. 509–58, at 510–1; G.N. Gill, ‘A Green Tribunal for India’ (2010) 22(3) Journal of
Environmental Law, pp. 461–74, at 462–3.
47 AIR 1987 SC 965.
48 1996(3) SCC 212.
49 N. 45 above.
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Such courts could have wider powers in order to make local inspections and hear oral
evidence from resident panels of environmental scientists.50
In 2009 when the Green Tribunal Bill was debated in Parliament,51 the NGT was
mooted to be ‘one element of a reformist approach to environmental governance’.52
The government proposed the creation of a circuit system for the new tribunal.
Innovation and change were needed; this occurred through the establishment of the
NGT after the passing of the National Green Tribunal Act in June 2010.53
5.2. Statutory Powers
The NGT decides cases relating to environmental protection and conservation of
forests and other natural resources, including the enforcement of any legal right
relating to the environment, and it provides relief and awards compensation for
damage to persons and property. The NGT was established on 18 October 2010 and
became operational on 5 May 2011, with New Delhi selected as the site for the
principal bench.54 The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), Government of
India, issued a notiﬁcation, on 17 August 2011, establishing regional benches of the
NGT in Bhopal, Pune, Chennai and Kolkata to cover the central, western, southern
and eastern zones of India.55
The NGT’s composition, jurisdiction, powers and procedures are construed by
reference to the provisions of the NGT Act 2010.56 This enactment is read and
construed cumulatively to achieve objectivity in examining dimensions of the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal and to interpret the relevant provisions for securing the
ﬁelds in which the Tribunal can effectively settle disputes or issues relating to
environmental jurisprudence within the framework of the NGT Act.57 The NGT is a
multi-faceted and multi-skilled body in which the joint decision makers hold relevant
qualiﬁcations and appropriate work experience either in law or in technical ﬁelds.
The NGT is vested with three forms of jurisdiction within the framework of the
NGT Act 2010: original, appellate and special jurisdiction.58 The original
jurisdiction, under section 14 of the Act, is exercised in civil cases59 in relation to a
50 The Law Commission of India, 186th Report (2003), pp. 8–9.
51 The Bill was introduced in Parliament on 31 July 2009; passed in Lok Sabha (the lower house) on
30 Apr. 2010 and in Rajya Sabha (the upper house) on 5 May 2010.
52 Statement made by Jairam Ramesh, former Minister of Environment and Forests, in the Indian
Parliament, Apr. 2010, available at: http://www.igovernment.in/news/31968/india-sets-up-national-
green-tribunal.
53 N. 35 above.
54 Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), Government of India, Notiﬁcation, 5 May 2011,
SO 1003 E.
55 MoEF, Government of India, Notiﬁcation, 17 Aug. 2011, SO 1908 E.
56 M.P. Pollution Control Board v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Bhopal, NGT Judgment,
8 Aug. 2013.
57 Sunil Kumar Samanta v. West Bengal Pollution Control Board, NGT Judgment, 24 July 2014.
58 Wilfred J. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests, NGT Judgment, 17 July 2014.
59 The NGT in M.P. Pollution Control Board (n. 56 above) observed: ‘Once the legislature restricts the
jurisdiction of the tribunal only to civil cases, then that jurisdiction is incapable of being expanded to
the cases which are patently and substantially criminal in nature’.
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substantial question relating to the environment.60 This includes the enforcement of
any legal right relating to the environment and such questions that arise out of the
implementation of the enactments speciﬁed in Schedule I to the Act.61 The subject
matter of an original application should therefore be a civil case and relate to a
substantial question concerning the environment. The appellate jurisdiction is controlled
under section 16 of the NGT Act 2010. The Tribunal is the appellate authority
competent to decide questions of law and fact against orders and decisions passed by
authorities under the enactments speciﬁed in Schedule I.62 The power is of a wide and
overriding nature and may be exercised ex debito justitiae (that is, in the interests of
justice).63 An aggrieved person has the right to approach the Tribunal under its original
or appellate jurisdiction, and it is important to note that the ‘aggrieved person’ in
environmental matters has been given a liberal and ﬂexible interpretation.64 In
environmental matters, the damage is not necessarily conﬁned to the local area as the
effects of environmental degradation might have far-reaching consequences going
beyond the immediate locality. Therefore, an aggrieved person need not be a resident of
the local area: any person – whether a resident of that particular area or not and
whether personally, directly or otherwise aggrieved – may approach the Tribunal.
Section 15 of the NGT Act 2010 provides the Tribunal with special jurisdiction to order
relief and compensation to victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising
under the enactments speciﬁed in Schedule I, for restitution of damaged property and for
restitution of the environment in such areas as the Tribunal may think ﬁt. Thus, the
dimensions and areas in which the NGT may exercise jurisdiction are very wide.
The NGT is mandated to pass orders, decisions and awards in conformity with
sustainable development, and the precautionary and polluter pays principles.65 In
M.P. Patil v. Union of India66 the Tribunal observed:
the three principal maxims governing the ﬁeld of environment are the sustainable
development, the polluter pays and the precautionary principles. Under the Indian
environmental jurisprudence, these three principles are statutorily prescribed. Develop-
ment may be carried out to satisfy the need of a developing society but it has to be
regulated so as to satisfy the requirement of preservation and nurturing of the natural
resources, which are the real assets of the society.67
60 The NGT Act 2010, s. 2(m), classiﬁes ‘substantial question relating to the environment’ under two
heads: (i) where there is a direct violation of a statutory duty or environmental obligation which is
likely to affect the community, or the gravity of damage to the environment or property is substantial,
or the damage to public health is broadly measurable; (ii) where the environmental consequences relate
to a speciﬁc activity or a point source of pollution.
61 The enactments in Sch. I include the following: Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974;
Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act 1977; Forests (Conservation) Act 1980; Air
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1981; Environment (Protection) Act 1986; Public Liability
Insurance Act 1981; and Biological Diversity Act 2002.
62 Ibid.
63 Wilfred J. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests, n. 58 above.
64 Goa Foundation v. Union of India, NGT Judgment, 18 July 2013; Betty C. Alvares v. State of Goa,
NGT Judgment, 14 Feb. 2014.
65 NGT Act 2010, s. 20.
66 NGT Judgment, 13 Mar. 2014.
67 Ibid., paras 72 and 74.
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The NGT is a fulcrum for sustainable development, but striking a balance between the
environment and development continues to be both complex and contentious.
The article proceeds to consider the use of expert knowledge in applying the above-
mentioned principles in deciding environmental disputes.
6. applying theory to the ngt
This section deals with the important theoretical work developed by two political
scientists, Peter Haas68 and Lorna Schreﬂer,69 although neither has applied and tested
his or her work within an adjudicatory institution, such as the NGT. Haas has
characterized epistemic communities as being made up of experts with professional
training, enjoying social authority based upon the reputation for impartial activities.
Schreﬂer’s contribution to this article concerns the application of her theory of
knowledge utilization as embedded in a speciﬁc procedural decision-making tribunal:
in this case the NGT. The section starts by applying Haas’s work and is followed by
relating Schreﬂer’s knowledge utilization to the NGT.
6.1. Expert: Value
A scientiﬁc consensus that applies regulations and promotes scientiﬁc input focusing
upon environmental sustainability and human welfare creates the ‘epistemic
community’. The ‘community’ is composed of neutral, scientiﬁc experts who are
active contributors within a decision-making, legal forum: the NGT.
The diverse scientiﬁc expertise lends further credence to the environmental legitimacy
of the NGT. The ‘epistemic qualities’ of the experts as competent individuals, who are
recognized as national and international experts in a range of environmental areas,
promotes independence from any party line, organizational bias or corporate association.
The NGT benches include scientists with expertise in environmental sciences,
environmental engineering, environmental governance, environmental safeguards,
industrial and urban environmental management, urban environmental pollution,
environmental law and policy, and forestry. The status of NGT experts as ‘nationally
and internationally recognized specialists’ can be judged by external indicators. These
include previous appointments to high-level committees, representing India in
environmental issues, drafting and negotiating multilateral environmental agreements,
peer-reviewed publications, and recognition through professional awards.70
The value of expert bench members is acknowledged and appreciated by
the judicial members. Judge 1 stated: ‘The expert members come with wide
knowledge. Professors, technocrats and administrators with wide environmental
knowledge are a part of the NGT decision-making process. Their contribution
is substantial’.71 Judges 2 and 5 added: ‘The real solution comes from the
expert members. The input of expert members is much more valuable for
68 Haas, nn. 22 and 23 above.
69 Schreﬂer, n. 25 above.
70 NGT website, n. 6 above.
71 Interview, 16 July 2014.
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environmental matters’.72 Judges 3 and 6 commented: ‘This is the speciality of the
Tribunal which has not only judicial talent but also expert talent. This is a peculiarity
of the Tribunal. It is a balanced way of doing work’.73
The scientiﬁc input of the experts on the ﬁve benches is appreciated by those who
appear before them as lawyers or as litigants. For instance, Senior Lawyer 1 stated:
‘The presence of expert members on the NGT bench is a step in the right direction.
The expert members better understand and deliberate the complex environmental
issues. Expert members have specialist knowledge on environmental matters which
many a time the lawyers do not have’.74
Senior Lawyer 2, with 25 years’ standing and an amicus appointed by Bench 4,
told me:
This is a bench having an expert member with relevant expertise and is a body
predisposed to environmental issues. You do not have to argue why you are here but you
have to argue your case. Judges in the High Courts of India are not necessarily
acquainted with environmental law and the lawyer has to start from scratch. However,
in the NGT, the expert member knows and understands the problem. I have seen expert
members asking questions which both parties have not thought of.75
Young lawyers in Pune and Chennai felt that the expert members introduce ecological
awareness and try to resolve the problem rather than simply decide the case. This
offers a steep learning curve for many lawyers. To quote:
The composition of the NGT bench with its expert member is an effective way to deal
with environmental matters. The High Court or the Supreme Court judges fail to
understand the environmental issues. A bench of this kind with an expert member is
creating new environmental jurisprudence. The expert members help young lawyers
understand environmental issues.76
Litigants also praise the bench composition. Litigants 1, 2 and 3 stated:
The NGT is our only hope because there are experts sitting who understand the problem.
We are ordinary citizens who daily see the environmental destruction and its impact on
us and future generations. Honestly, the environment is a sensitive issue which should
only be handled by experts. Our experience has been tremendous in the NGT benches.
We are attending the case in person and have come three to ﬁve times to the NGT. Judges
are very sensitive and understand what we have placed before them and are able to take
our cause without us knowing the law. For us this is a heartening experience. This NGT
is a life saver. [The] NGT has given us justice and in future we will get justice because the
judges are experts who are concerned about the environment and understand what they
are saying. Most importantly, this we do not ﬁnd in other courts, such as the High
Court.77
72 Interviews, 4 Aug. 2014 and 8 Mar. 2015.
73 Interviews, 25 and 30 July 2014.
74 Interview, 17 July 2014.
75 Interview, 31 July 2014.
76 Interviews, 30 July and 1 Aug. 2014.
77 Interview, 1 Aug. 2014.
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6.2. Expert: Neutrality
At present there are ten professionally qualiﬁed, expert members of the NGT,
although there is a strong case in favour of increasing the number of expert members
on the regional benches.78 They must have a minimum of 15 years’ experience in the
relevant ﬁeld or administrative experience, including ﬁve years’ practical experience
in environmental matters in a reputed national-level institution or central or state
government.79 Court 1 has six expert members (three sitting in two courts) whereas
Courts 2 to 5 each has one scientiﬁc member. These experts, working alongside
legally qualiﬁed judges, constitute an interdisciplinary decision-making body.
The selection process of the Tribunal members is structured to minimize executive
inﬂuence. The process of selection is set out in the National Green Tribunal
Appointment Rules.80 This appointment process promotes transparency, accountability,
neutrality and independence. InWilfred J. v.Ministry of Environment and Forests,81 the
NGT observed:
There is nothing in the provision of the NGT Act that directly or even by necessary
implication is indicative of any external control over the National Green Tribunal …
[The] Ministry of Environment and Forests is merely an administrative ministry for the
National Green Tribunal to provide for means and ﬁnances. Once the budget is pro-
vided, the Ministry cannot have any interference in the functioning of the National Green
Tribunal. The entire process of appointment and even removal is under the effective
control of the Supreme Court of India, as neither appointments nor removals can be
effected without the participation and approval of a sitting judge of the Supreme Court
of India. The administration is merely an executing agency within the framework of
the Act.82
Judge 1 of the NGT informed me that he identiﬁed himself as the leader of a team that
he was involved in selecting. He sought the necessary experience, expertise, character
and awareness that would make them effective judges of environmental matters
throughout India. Judge 1 stated: ‘I am really very happy with the experts. All the
experts have been picked by me. I was a judge of the Supreme Court and the
Chairman of the Selection Committee. So I have made some contribution in this
regard. I ﬁnd these people extremely good in their ﬁeld’.83
India’s patronage culture of providing sinecure, post-retirement assignments to
former judges, senior administrators and technocrats in judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies at the national and state levels has been questioned and accusations made of
78 NGT website, n. 6 above.
79 The NGT Act 2010, s. 4(1), provides that the NGT is to consist of a full-time chairperson and no fewer
than 10 (but subject to a maximum of 20) full-time judicial and expert members; s. 5(2) spells out that
the judicial members must have the requisite legal expertise and experience and the expert members
will include technical experts from life sciences, physical science, engineering or technology.
80 The National Green Tribunal (Manner of Appointment of Judicial and Expert Members, Salaries,
Allowances and other Terms and Conditions of Service of Chairperson and other Members and Procedure
for Enquiry) Rules 2010 and 2012, available at: http://www.greentribunal.gov.in/ngt_rules.aspx.
81 N. 58 above.
82 Ibid., para 34.
83 Interview, n. 71 above.
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‘give and take’.84 Suggestions such as a transparent selection process or a ‘cooling off
period’ of three or four years before accepting any such positions have been made to
dissuade the ‘senior and most respected people’ on the verge of retirement from
improper or questionable association with corporations, institutions or people of
inﬂuence. In Kalpavriksh v. Union of India,85 for instance, the NGT addressed the
issue of relevant qualiﬁcations being required for MoEF appointments to committees
dealing with environmental issues, speciﬁcally the Ministry’s Expert Appraisal
Committee (EAC) and the State Expert Appraisal Committee (SEAC). The Tribunal
asked the Ministry to provide revised eligibility criteria and speciﬁc requirements for
persons to be appointed as chairperson and members of the EACs and SEACs in
accordance with provisions of the Environment Impact Assessment Notiﬁcation
2006. Further, a note of caution was added: ‘If people who are not strictly qualiﬁed
and eligible in the ﬁeld of environment are selected … The obvious result would be
improper application of mind. … It would lead to improper consideration and
disposal of application for clearance ﬁled by the project proponent’.86
A US environmental judge informed me that ‘the Tribunal is a proven model for
my state as its bench is comprised of independent, carefully appointed judges who are
unafraid of making difﬁcult decisions. [The] NGT is an example of informed judicial
courage’.87 For the NGT the statutory provisions act as a benchmark for a rigorous
appointment process subject to public scrutiny. This reduces the possibility of
cronyism and encourages independent and impartial decisions leading to transparent,
effective environmental decision making, which in turn promotes awareness and trust
amongst the citizenry. Interview data with court lawyers and litigants demonstrates
that they ultimately appreciate a selection procedure that results in the appointment
of qualiﬁed scientists who apply their expertise to make informed decisions that
promote environmental justice.88
6.3. Schreﬂer’s Variables
Schreﬂer’s work suggests that undertaking effective, empirical institutional research is
limited by the presence of variables such as multiple external stakeholders that seek to
pursue their claim to participate in environmental regulation. Schreﬂer states that ‘the
higher the number of stakeholders, the greater the degree of conﬂict, as each player is
likely to generate conﬂicting pressures and demands on the agency’.89 Fortunately, the
NGT, as a judicial body, enjoys a high, although not absolute, degree of jurisdictional
immunity from the advances of the stakeholders and, indeed, it acknowledges them
largely on its own terms, such as through the ‘stakeholder consultative adjudicatory
84 A. Chatterjee, ‘Stormy Sinecures’, The Telegraph (Calcutta), 24 Sept. 2014, available at:
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140924/jsp/opinion/story_18866574.jsp#.VIx04nuHjtU.
85 NGT Judgment, 17 July 2014.
86 Ibid., para. 33.
87 Interview, 14 Mar. 2015.
88 Interview, 15 Mar. 2015; see nn. 76 and 77 above.
89 Schreﬂer, ‘The Usage of Scientiﬁc Knowledge’, n. 25 above, p. 316.
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process’.90 These consultations take place on the NGT’s premises and stakeholders are
invited to participate under the jurisdiction, procedures and chairmanship of the NGT.
Further, the NGT has been shielded from the potentially challenging agendas of
external stakeholders by the well-established doctrine in India of the independence of
the judiciary.91 While it is clear that the decisions of the NGT are subject to appeal to
the Supreme Court,92 what is not open to appeal is the internal, conﬁdential,
decision-making process itself. This process is not public, although this article,
through its detailed ﬁeldwork, identiﬁes and explains the internal decision-making
process that is founded on the ‘principle of collegiality’. Thus, in the absence of
effective pressure from external stakeholders, the NGT benches have exercised
judicial independence,93 which has allowed the NGT to develop its own internal
decision-making process. The small number of bench members, exercising a jointly
constructed decision-making procedure in a private setting, produces a sense of
collegiality and reduces the importance and inﬂuence of external stakeholders.
It is clear that scientiﬁc expert involvement through the process of ‘collegiality’
offers an effective way to generate enhanced legitimacy and public approval. Harry T.
Edwards notes that collegiality results in a ‘process’ which creates conditions that
ultimately produce a principled agreement: the judgment.94 He does not accept that
collegiality is founded simply upon friendship, homogeneity or conformity. Instead it
is a matter of common concern to get the law right. To quote: ‘Collegiality plays an
important role in mitigating the role of partisan politics and personal ideology
by allowing judges of different perspectives and philosophies to communicate
with, listen to, and ultimately inﬂuence one another in constructive and law-
abiding ways’.95
This is not to deny that individuals have personal, social or political positions that
might inﬂuence their decisions, but rather that the overriding process of collegiality
helps to ensure that decisions are not pre-ordained as a consequence of these
extraneous relationships, thoughts and inﬂuences. This process is not unistructural; it
is a sophisticated combination of rules, customs, routines, legal obligations,
leadership skills, mutual trust, personal conﬁdence and the shared belief in
common goals. Together, these qualities create the process of collegiality.
Strong, positive collegial relationships allow and promote judicial independence of
mind and discussion resulting in an interdependent and interdisciplinary decision-
making process. This interdependence ensures that each person’s intellectual and
90 See text accompanying n. 115 below.
91 Namit Sharma v. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC 745; C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M.
Bhattacharjee (1995) 5 SCC 457.
92 NGT Act 2010, s. 22. The appeal under s. 22 may be ﬁled only on the grounds provided in s. 100, Civil
Procedure Code, 1908, which include a substantial question of law (i.e., a debatable question, not
previously settled by the law of land, or which has a binding precedent and does not involve a pure
question of fact): see Amol v. State of Maharashtra, NGT Judgment, 17 Feb. 2015.
93 This is not to say that this independence is total and absolute: see Section 7 on suo motu powers and
the conclusion.
94 H.T. Edwards, ‘The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making’ (2003) 151 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, pp. 1639–90.
95 Ibid., p. 1656. However, for a criticism of ‘collegiality’ see Paterson, n. 9 above, pp. 142–3.
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judicial strengths are recognized and introduced to the collective decision-making
process. It allows each judge to check his personal position with that of an alternative
view from a possibly better informed or experienced colleague. Edwards welcomes
and promotes diversity. He welcomes the idea that ‘differences in professional and
personal background, areas of expertise … diversity among the judges make for
better informed discussion’.96
Collegiality has a function in institutionalizing judges into shared understanding
and action, particularly if the size of the bench is small. Deliberation, conformity and
cohesion are reﬂected in the teamwork and collective practice exercised throughout
the ﬁve NGT benches. The lead provided by Judge 1 to the teamwork practice is
based upon a collaborative approach. According to Judge 1:
What we do is to have a pre-hearing conference and a post hearing conference. Normally,
even while passing a small order, I like to interact with the judicial and expert members so
that there is complete coherence and unanimity because sometimes what you think may be
wrong and what the other person may suggest is right. I give full margin to that possibility.
Secondly, whosoever authors the judgment, we have a pre-writing session where we
discuss the facts and I and other judicial members state what is the law and the legal
position. Then the experts tell us the technical aspects. I ask the technical members to give
me a short note. Then we consider it. Then I, or another judicial member or expert member
prepares a draft. Next we deliberate the draft. Then we get in writing an agreement by each
expert and judicial member. Ultimately, the judgment is ﬁnalised.97
Experts 2, 3 and 6 ﬁnd this process of drafting a judgment to be extremely valuable.
They agreed that:
We always have a discussion on the important issues before we go to the court. But also
before writing a judgment a technical note is required by the judicial member who is writing
the judgment. Often the entire technical note is reproduced and forms part of the judgment.
We have never had a dispute as we always discuss and have an agreement before we
pronounce the judgment. The ﬁnal judgment is always written in a draft form circulated to
all the members before signing the judgment. Every member reads it and has a right to
correct, delete or modify [it] even if it is a major part of the judgment. Finally the judgment
is signed and pronounced. This is an internal unwritten practice followed in [the] NGT.98
Teamwork,99 consensus and clarity,100 and the blending of opinions and expertise101
are characteristics and terms commonly expressed by the regional judges.102
My ﬁeldwork suggests there is a close personal and working relationship
between Tribunal members, which in part reﬂects the small numbers on each bench.
96 Edwards, n. 94 above, p. 1668.
97 Interview, n. 71 above. For a detailed discussion on ‘collegiality and the NGT’ see G.N. Gill, ‘National
Green Tribunal: Judge Craft, Decision Making and Collegiality’ (2014) 2 National Green Tribunal
International Journal of Environment, pp. 43–53.
98 Interviews, 14, 15 and 16 July 2014. Bench 5 NGT also follows the same process.
99 Bench 2 NGT, interview, 25 July 2014.
100 Bench 3 NGT, interview, 22 July 2014.
101 Bench 4 NGT, interview, 30 July 2014.
102 To date there has been only one instance of a two-judge bench failing to agree. The matter is referred
and pending before the Chairperson, in accordance with the NGT Act 2010, s. 21.
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There appears to be no hierarchy, disciplinary priority or external pressure that
determines a scientiﬁc or legal bias in their decision-making process. Their accounts
of their internal operating processes and interpersonal relationships reﬂect the
recognition of seeking a common goal – that of environmental justice.
6.4. The Application of Expert Knowledge
Schreﬂer identiﬁes three possible uses of expert knowledge by regulators: (i) symbolic
(strengthening the agency’s reputation and legitimacy; such knowledge is decoupled
from policy decisions); (ii) instrumental (identifying the best solution to a given
problem); and (iii) strategic (advocating a pre-deﬁned policy position or providing
arguments to expand the power of the agency).103
My ﬁeldwork highlights the contribution of judge-scientists to the NGT’s
environmental decision making through the independent application of science free
from political considerations. It shows how the participation of scientiﬁc expertise in
various cases and interviews reveals the different typologies of the use of expert
knowledge. It provides an opportunity for the empirical application of Schreﬂer’s
categories.
Symbolic
The symbolic use of expertise is reﬂected in the NGT as it is a specialized body
equipped with the necessary expertise to handle environmental disputes involving
multi-disciplinary issues. A ﬁve-bench judgment in Wilfred J. v. Ministry of
Environment and Forests104 stated that ‘the Tribunal must inspire conﬁdence and
public esteem. It should be manned by expert minds and persons of judicial acumen
and experts from the relevant ﬁeld with capacity to decide cases with the judicial
members. The Tribunal should have [an] effective and efﬁcacious mechanism’. The
NGT is regarded as a forum for testing the idea that economic advancement is tightly
wired to public safety, and to the security of water, air, and land.105 In Braj
Foundation v. Government of Uttar Pradesh106 the Tribunal stated:
It is clear that the NGT is distinct from other tribunals either created as per the
provisions of the Constitution of India or otherwise. It is a constitutional creature with a
speciﬁc purpose on the basis of certain principles like sustainable development, [the]
precautionary principle and [the] polluter pays principle. The NGT, which proceeds to
adjudicate … disputes which involve substantial questions relating to [the] environment,
consists of expert members apart from judicial members … there is nothing to presume
that the NGT is either subordinate to any High Court or under the powers of
superintendence of any High Court.107
103 Schreﬂer, n. 25 above.
104 N. 58 above.
105 K. Schneider, ‘India’s National Green Tribunal Challenges Government and Industry to Follow the Law’,
Circle of Blue, 17 Nov. 2014, available at: http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2014/commentary/
editorial-in-the-circle-fresh-focus/indias-national-green-tribunal-challenges-government-industry.
106 NGT Judgment, 5 Aug. 2014.
107 Ibid., paras 23, 25.
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Instrumental
Instrumentally, the NGT experts believe in a problem-solving approach by advancing
scientiﬁc inputs into the decision-making process, which subsequently ﬁlters through
to improve environmental management. This innovative development by the NGT
moves traditional, single-issue, legal dispute ‘adjudication’ between the disputing
parties beyond the ‘courtroom door’ in its implicit and sometimes explicit creation of
scientiﬁcally justiﬁed policy, which seeks to ensure minimal damage to the
environment and the protection of the larger interest of society. Expert 5, for
instance, illustrated the instrumental use of expertise and its consequential wider
impact by reference to the cutting of trees. He stated:
Where there are gaps or limitations in the policy, the NGT inter[ven]es and gives
directions to the government to incorporate the same. For example, cases were ﬁled
against the cutting of fully grown trees in Delhi due to various developmental activities.
There were no policy guidelines by the MoEF to state governments or urban bodies. I
asked the authorities about exploring the possibility of translocating the trees elsewhere
depending upon the season, soil, species, age and other factors. Accordingly, guidelines
were issued to the MoEF to incorporate translocation of trees as a mandatory policy
prescription before permitting the cutting of trees.108
The case of Asim Sarode v. Maharashtra Pollution Control Board109 identiﬁed the
use of Expert 7’s expertise in a judgment which develops a scientiﬁcally based
approach to the problem of the disposal of used tyres. This expert member considered
the urgent need to develop regulations to deal systematically with the issue based on
the ‘life cycle approach’, considering the pollution potential, data on tyre generation,
technology options, techno-economic viability and the social implications on the basis
of the principles of sustainable development and the precautionary principle.110 The
judgment reﬂects the scientiﬁc input of the expert member and suggests approaches,
such as extended producers’ responsibility, advanced recycling charges, common
facilities and use of bar coding, to ensure the effective collection and disposal of
used tyres.
The NGT, in its commitment to resolve environmental issues, may adopt an
investigative procedure, thereby suggesting the instrumental use of knowledge. This
procedure, upheld by the Supreme Court in Ministry of Environment & Forests v.
Nirma Ltd,111 involves the inspection of affected sites by expert members.112 The
purpose of site inspection is to compare and contrast contradictory claims, positions
and reports ﬁled by the respective parties. The use of Expert 6’s expertise in a
municipal solid waste case explains this point. According to Expert 6:
Normally we go into the details of technical and scientiﬁc aspects of the issue and its impact.
We also conduct local inspections at the site and examine the prevailing conditions.
108 Interview, 25 July 2014.
109 NGT Judgment, 6 Sept. 2014.
110 Ibid., paras 8, 17.
111 Civil Appeal No. 8781-83/2013, 4 Aug. 2014.
112 K.K. Singh v. National Ganga River Basin Authority, NGT Judgment, 16 Oct. 2014.
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We discuss the situation with the people inhabiting the area. We go into the entire sub-
mission of parties and look into the feasible options to solve the problem. For example, in
the state of Punjab, municipal solid waste (MSW) is a big problem and the litigation is
pending before us. Punjab generates 4250 tons of MSW every day. I drafted a model
action plan for the handling of the MSW based upon important principles, namely,
effective segregation, collection and transportation; maximum resources recovery; effective
treatment; and safe disposal. The copy of the model action plan was circulated to the
Bhopal bench on their request so that the same could be replicated in the state of Madhya
Pradesh. Eighty percent of pollution in India is because of sewage due to rapid urban-
ization. A facility, if fully established and made optimally operative, would not only help
the public at large but would largely serve the purpose of environmental protection.113
The NGT, in Pathankot Welfare Association v. State of Punjab,114 gave effect to this
model action plan for solid waste by pronouncing it as general law. Encapsulating
such a wide-ranging policy within the judgment promotes the larger public interest
and dramatically expands traditional judicial functions associated with case
management and disposal of the individual case.
The stakeholder consultative adjudicatory process is the most recent of the NGT’s
problem-solving procedures. It demonstrates the instrumental usage within the
formal structure of the NGT of both internal and external experts in parallel with the
stakeholders in order to understand and seek solutions to issues of national
importance. Judge 1 stated:
For [the] protection and preservation of the environment, all stakeholders involved in the
consultative adjudicatory process for [the] enforcement of environmental law have to
come together and act. It is not applicable to a day-to-day case or a party-to-party case.
This process is applicable to cases of wider ramiﬁcation involving major issues like river
cleaning or air pollution. Major issues having a public impact either on public health,
[the] environment or ecology can be better handled and resolved when stakeholders are
brought together with the Tribunal’s scientiﬁc judges for eliciting the views of all
concerned – government, scientists, NGOs, public and the NGT. Stakeholder process
will provide a greater element of consent rather than opposition to a judgment.115
Expert 2 echoed the same opinion by identifying the ongoing Yamuna river116 and air
pollution117 cases as illustrations of the new stakeholder consultative adjudicatory
process.118 Efforts are being made here to ensure that the scientiﬁcally driven judgments
reﬂect the interests, expectations and plans of the stakeholders in order to produce a
decision which supports sustainable development and the wider public interest.
113 Interview, 14 July 2014. I was given a copy, by Expert Member 6, of the ‘Model Action Plan: Municipal
Solid Waste Management in Punjab’ (Jan. 2014, available at: http://pmidc.punjab.gov.in/export/sites/
default/.content/ﬂexiblecontents/Punjab-Model-Municipal-Solid-Waste-Management-Plan-
2014.pdf), which details the technical aspects of MSW.
114 NGT Judgment, 25 Nov. 2014.
115 Interview, 14 Apr. 2015.
116 Manoj Mishra v. Union of India, NGT Judgment, 13 Jan. 2015 (now referred to as the Maily se
Nirmal Yamuna Revitalization Plan 2017).
117 Vardhaman Kaushik v. Union of India and Sanjay Kulshrestha v. Union of India, NGT Order,
7 Apr. 2015
118 Interview, 12 Apr. 2015.
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Schreﬂer also states that instrumental usage can be adopted by an agency ‘to
develop and strengthen its ability to cope with thorny policy problems in the future’.
India’s environmental issues that reﬂect its economic development policies are an
ongoing challenge which is regularly faced and addressed by the NGT. It is in this
context of current and future challenges that the use of the expertise of Expert 5
became central in the matter relating to the Biosphere Reserve (BR), particularly the
sensitive Achanakmar-Amarkantak Biosphere Reserve (AABR), the subject matter of
Narmada Khand Swabhiman Sewa v. State of Madhya Pradesh.119 The AABR is
included in the world network of BRs under the UNESCO programme. The scientiﬁc
expert, in the judgment, suggested the introduction of a policy change to integrate
aspects of biodiversity protection and commercial activities in the BRs. Such policy
should critically assess sustainability and be accompanied by a set of related
quantitative, qualitative and descriptive attributes, identiﬁed by means of the
preparation of a landscape plan to be followed by a detailed environmental impact
assessment (EIA) on the principle of sustainable development.120
Strategic
Schreﬂer’s framework recognizes the exercise of expert knowledge for political and
substantiating purposes. Strategic political usage can be employed ‘to expand its (agency)
power and strengthen its prestige and reputation’. The political strategic use of
knowledge can be illustrated in the NGT through the expansion of its power arising from
its decision to initiate suo motu (on its own motion) proceedings in environmental cases.
The NGT is typically triggered by an aggrieved person ﬁling a motion. In suo motu
proceedings a court acts on its own volition in the absence of parties. Interestingly, the
NGT Act 2010 does not expressly provide the authority to initiate suo motu proceedings.
Furthermore, in 2012 the NGT, in Baijnath Prajapati v. MoEF,121 commented that ‘at
the same time it is mentionable that we are not conferred with suo motu powers’.122
Nevertheless, within a couple of years the Tribunal’s position had changed so as to
increase its powers by claiming suo motu jurisdiction.
The NGT expanded its jurisdiction by taking suo motu cognizance of stories
published in the news media. Cases such as increased vehicular trafﬁc in Himachal
Pradesh,123 dolomite mining in the tiger reserve forest in Kanha National Park,124
groundwater contamination in the water supply lines and borewells in Delhi,125
119 NGT Judgment, 1 Oct. 2014.
120 Expert 5 further stated that the preparation of the landscape plan must take account of the con-
servation and maintenance of biological diversity, sustainable utilization of natural resources and
stabilization of the terrain; improvement and regulation of the hydrological regime; people’s
involvement in the planning and management of natural resources, and fulﬁlling the socio-economic
and livelihood needs of the people.
121 NGT Judgment, 20 Jan. 2012.
122 Ibid., para. 9.
123 Tribunal on its own Motion v. State of Himachal Pradesh, NGT Judgment, 6 Feb. 2014.
124 Tribunal on its own Motion v. Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests, NGT Judgment,
4 Apr. 2014.
125 Tribunal on its own Motion v. Government of NCT, Delhi, NGT Order, 19 June 2015.
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high levels of pollution near the Adyar estuary,126 and the clearing and felling of trees
in the Sathyamanglam Tiger Reserve127 are illustrative of the NGT initiating suo
motu proceedings. These cases reﬂect the Tribunal’s self-proclaimed, expansionist
power to review environmental issues, ab initio, simply on the grounds of
environmental protection and human welfare. According to Judge 1, ‘suo motu
jurisdiction has to be an integral part of the NGT for better and effective functioning
of the institution. There are some inherent powers which are vital for effective
functioning and suo motu jurisdiction is one such power’.128
While this proactive decision by the NGT to adopt the practice of suo motu
falls squarely within Schreﬂer’s political strategic categorization, it also
simultaneously attracted the negative attention of external stakeholders. The
principal critic, the MoEF, refused to confer suo motu power on the Tribunal
despite repeated requests. In an afﬁdavit ﬁled before the Supreme Court of India, the
MoEF stated that ‘the government of India has not agreed to confer suo motu powers
on the Tribunal. It is for the NGT, an adjudicatory body, to follow the provisions of
the NGT Act 2010’.129 No doubt, the NGT has strengthened its prestige and public
reputation, but this has been achieved at a cost. Its very success has sown the seeds of
concern within external institutions with roles and responsibilities for environmental
management and environmental justice. However, if one looks beyond strict
statutory interpretation, the NGT’s liberal interpretation of its founding statute has
resulted in this expression of concern. The MoEF has frequently been subject to
severe criticism by the NGT for failing to observe its own procedural rules, such as
the improper granting of licences without prior EIAs having being completed or
appropriately conducted,130 and the Tribunal has been prepared to call senior civil
servants before the court to hear what often amount to inappropriate or implausible
explanations for MoEF decisions.131 Indeed, in Sudeip Shrivastava v. State of
Chhattisgarh132 the Tribunal took the unusual step of criticizing the Minister of State
126 R. Sivaraman, ‘Prevent Dumping of Waste in Adyar River: Tribunal’, The Hindu, 21 Nov. 2013,
available at: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-tamilnadu/prevent-dumping-of-
waste-in-adyar-river-tribunal/article5373982.ece.
127 ‘NGT Takes Note of Report in The Hindu’, The Hindu, 24 Oct. 2013, available at: http://www.
thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/ngt-takes-note-of-report-in-the-hindu/article5265680.ece.
128 Interview, n. 71 above: Judges 4 and 5 agreed with Judge 1 in their interviews of 6 and 8 Apr. 2015;
see also S. Kumar, ‘The NGTMust Have Suo Motu Powers’,Down to Earth, 30 Nov. 2014, available
at: http://www.downtoearth.org.in/interviews/ngt-must-have-suo-motu-powers-47542.
129 A. Vishnoi, ‘No Suo Motu Powers Provided for You, MoEF Tells Green Tribunal’, The Indian
Express Archive, 26 Aug. 2013, available at: http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/no-suo-motu-
powers-provided-for-you-moef-tells-green-tribunal/1160046.
130 Sreeranganathan K.P. and Aranmula v. Union of India, NGT Judgment, 28 May 2014; Prafulla
Samantray v. Union of India, NGT Judgment, 30 Mar. 2012; Rohit Choudhary v. Union of India,
NGT Judgment, 7 Sept. 2012; Samata v. Union of India, NGT Judgment, 13 Dec. 2013.
131 ‘NGT Issues Warrant against MoEF Secretary’, Hindustan Times, 27 Mar. 2015, available at:
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/ngt-issues-warrant-agianst-moef-secretary/article1-1331
135.aspx; ‘NGT Summons Environment Sec’y over MoEF’s Absence from Hearings’, The Economic
Times, 1 Dec. 2013, available at: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-12-01/news/
44619558_1_joint-secretary-the-ngt-moef.
132 NGT Judgment, 24 Mar. 2014.
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for Environment and Forests and the MoEF for acting arbitrarily and ignoring relevant
material issues to reach a holistic appraisal of the environmental issue.
The allegation of judicial overreach was bolstered when the High Court of Madras
restrained the NGT Chennai bench from initiating suo motu proceedings. The High
Court stated:
The NGT is not a substitute for the High Courts. The Tribunal has to function within the
parameters laid down by the NGT Act 2010. It should act within four corners of the
statute. There is no indication in the NGT Act or the rules made thereunder with regard
to the power of the NGT to initiate suo motu proceedings against anyone, including
statutory authorities.133
Schreﬂer’s strategic substantiating use of knowledge involves well-crafted scientiﬁc
knowledge that justiﬁes and supports a predetermined or preferred policy solution. In
this context, the NGT’s statutory mandate is to apply the principles of sustainable
development, and the precautionary and polluter pays principles.134 The concept of
sustainable development has become a complex and contentious issue as a result of
the current debate on either (a) giving ‘greater weight to economic beneﬁts [which],
because of their tangibility and quantiﬁability, tend to be given greater weight in these
balancing exercises than the often less tangible or immediate beneﬁts for society of
environmental protection’,135 or (b) acknowledging that ‘acceptability of economic
growth should be determined and limited by reference to [the] carrying capacity of
the natural system’.136
The NGT has become the cynosure of the application of sustainable development.
The bias is in favour of pragmatically embracing development for the maximization
of human welfare without causing irreversible damage to the environment. Living
within environmental limits by adopting the assimilative capacity principle strikes a
balance between the environment and development.
According to Experts 1, 3 and 4:
The concept of sustainable development is well documented but to practise [it] in the ﬁeld
is a challenge. The application of sustainable development is only possible if the judge is
technically sound. The balancing act is a ticklish issue. It is based upon [the] facts and
circumstances of the case. If the larger interest of the society is to be considered with
minimal damage to the environment then perhaps it can be balanced. [The e]conomic
interest of the society cannot proceed over the environmental interests.… residential and
133 A. Subramani, ‘Green Tribunal’s Wings Clipped, Madras High Court Halts Suo Motu Proceedings’,
The Times of India, 3 Jan. 2014, available at: http://timesoﬁndia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/Green-
tribunals-wings-clipped-Madras-high-court-halts-suo-motu-proceedings/articleshow/28346066.cms.
134 NGT Act 2010, s. 20.
135 S. Woolley, Ecological Governance Reappraising Law’s Role in Protecting Ecosystem Functionality
(Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 25; see also S. Owens, ‘Negotiated Environments: Needs,
Demands and Values in the Age of Sustainability’ (1997) 29 Environment and Planning A,
pp. 571–80.
136 G. Garver, ‘Introducing the Rule of Ecological Law’, in L. Westra, C.L. Soskolne & D.W. Spady (eds),
Human Health and Ecological Integrity: Ethics, Law and Human Rights (Routledge, 2012),
pp. 322–34; see also K. Bosselmann, ‘From Reductionist Environmental Law to Sustainability Law’,
in P. Burdon (ed.), Exploring Wild Law: The Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (Wakeﬁeld Press,
2011), pp. 204–13.
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commercial infrastructure development is one such area. On one side the population of
India is growing and we need housing for the people. Agricultural land is being diverted
for residential development. However, there are coastal zone regulations, forest
laws that need to be taken into account before such development is permitted.
The Environmental Impact Assessment regulations need to be strictly complied with.
That is one of the ﬁrst yardsticks for any evaluation of the sustainable development
process. However, in cases before us, the EIA process is often an eye-wash. Limited
involvement of affected people in the hearing, publication, scoping and screening issues,
no provision in place to cover landscape and visual impacts in the Indian EIA regulations
are some of the steps not followed properly. We go into the details to examine the project
and make [the] project proponent accountable for his activities.137
Again, the NGT scientiﬁc experts played a crucial role in the application of cumulative
environmental impact assessment (CEIA). The ability to incorporate cumulative effects
analysis into the development of alternatives for an environmental assessment can
minimize negative cumulative effects, promote resource sustainability and make room
for future development.138 In India, there have been serious failures in CEIA studies that
have rendered the crucial process meaningless, thereby violating Form 1, section 9 of the
EIA Notiﬁcation of September 2006, which asks for a cumulative impact assessment.139
On occasions, the Expert Appraisal Committee of the MoEF has taken a ‘casual
approach’ and has granted clearance for projects without performing due diligence.140
According to Expert 2, who specializes in environmental and social impact
assessment:
Cumulative impact consists of an impact that is created as a result of the combination of
the project evaluated in the EIA together with other projects in the same vicinity causing
related impacts. These impacts occur when the incremental impact of the project is
combined with the cumulative effects of other past, present and reasonably foreseeable
future projects. Cumulative impact may be [the] same [as] or different [from] those
arising out of individual activities and tend to be larger, long lasting and spread over a
greater area within the individual impact.
The importance of material data in the CEIA process cannot be underestimated. One is
expected to make studies regarding cumulative impacts of all the existing as well as
proposed industries; it is expected to collect actual ﬁeld data regarding each … existing
industry and together with information on [the] proposed industry interpret its impacts
on land, water, noise, terrestrial ecology and [the] socio-economic environment.
Deliberate concealment or submission of false or misleading information for the
137 Interviews, 15 and 22 July and 4 Aug. 2014.
138 See, generally, MoEF India, ‘Assessment of Cumulative Impact of Hydropower Projects in Alaknanda
and Bhagirathi Basins’, AHEC/2011, June 2011, Ch. 7, available at: http://www.moef.nic.in/
downloads/public-information/CH-7.pdf; see also Woolley, n. 135 above, pp. 184–5. Alternatives to
cumulative effect assessment include but are not limited to value ecosystem components and strategic
environmental analysis.
139 EIA Notiﬁcation, S.O. 1533(E), 14 Sept. 2006, available at: http://envfor.nic.in/legis/eia/eia-2006.htm;
see also ‘Cumulative Impact Assessment Study of Siang Basin in Arunachal Pradesh: Serious Short-
comings; Pro Large Hydro Bias’, South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People, 18 Feb. 2014,
available at: https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/02/18/cumulative-impact-assessment-study-of-siang-
basin-in-arunachal-needs-urgent-improvement.
140 T. Muruganandam v.Ministry of Environment & Forests, NGT Judgment, 11 Nov. 2014; Samata v.
Union of India, NGT Judgment, 13 Dec. 2013.
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purposes of screening, scoping or appraisal can lead … either [to] stipulating any other
environmental conditions or rejection of [the] application for environmental clearance
for the proposed project.141
The case of T. Muruganandam v. Ministry of Environment & Forests142 illustrates
the scientiﬁc concerns and expectations of the NGT in relation to acceptable CEIA
reports. The NGT quashed the environmental clearance given to a 3,600-megawatt
(MW) thermal power plant in Tamil Nadu on the ground that an appropriate CEIA
of the project had not been conducted. The CEIA report suffered from material
shortcomings and, to that extent, the report was ﬂawed: there was no mention of the
date and location of sampling as required in EIA reports; no study of the impact on
air quality had been undertaken; and no modelling had been carried out in respect of
any future projects. The cumulative impact assessment of the project was conducted
on the basis of incomplete information and non-existent standards, and the MoEF
granted clearance without considering these omissions. The NGT ordered a fresh
review of the environmental clearance on the basis of a fresh CEIA study.
This section of the article applies Schreﬂer’s theoretical framework to the NGT’s
institutional form and activities. It demonstrates the use of expertise as a continuum
process by generating hypotheses about ecological events and their impacts,
synthesizing information to identify knowledge and policy gaps, and providing
science-based ecological insights to adjudicate on domain speciﬁc case-based
problems.
The availability of a spectrum of scientiﬁc knowledge which reﬂects the wide range
of cases heard by the NGT remains an issue yet to be addressed. A balanced bench is
a sine qua non for the decision-making process. On the one hand, having too many
experts can lead to the slowing down or even the paralysis of the decision-making
process; at the same time too few experts can affect the quality of the decisions.143
The regional benches of the NGT face the problem of having only one expert and one
judicial member. The expert member may not have the expertise to handle a
particular environmental issue, which could result in an unsatisfactory decision. This
shortfall was echoed by Senior Lawyer 2 in Bench 4 in a case relating to forestry
matters:
All of my eighteen cases that were transferred from the Bombay High Court were related
to forest matters and law. I am afraid that the expert member is not acquainted with the
forest law. This is a problem of regional benches where there is only one expert member,
unlike the principal bench where there are six members.144
This position is shared by regional bench members, Judges 3, 4 and 5,145 who felt that
a broader scientiﬁc perspective generates hypotheses about environmental events and
141 Interview, 15 July 2014.
142 N. 140 above.
143 See, generally, L. Gruszczynski, ‘The Role of Experts in Environmental and Health-Related Trade
Disputes in the WTO: Deconstructing Decision-Making Processes’, in Ambrus et al., n. 1 above,
pp. 216–37, at 228.
144 Interview, n. 75 above.
145 Interviews, 29 Mar., 6 and 8 Apr. 2015.
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processes, and provides an evaluative statement to compare possible options in
support of decision making. They agreed that addressing this concern by consulting
universities or scientiﬁc institutions would contribute to the quality of the decision
making and ensure effective use of expert knowledge. In Ashok Gabaji Kajale v.
M/s Godhavari Bio-Reﬁneries Ltd, for example, the Tribunal appointed the
Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda to provide expertise and a report on
matters associated with groundwater pollution and ineffective industrial efﬂuent
management systems.146
This section has reviewed the NGT’s use of symbolic, instrumental and strategic
scientiﬁc knowledge. Being a recently created adjudicatory institution, none of the
three usages is currently prioritized by the NGT. It enjoys a symbiotic relationship,
which collectively builds and consolidates public trust in the effectiveness of its
decision-making capability as well as formulating scientiﬁcally justiﬁed policies for
environmental sustainability.
7. conclusion
This article seeks to add to the limited empirical studies on scientiﬁc knowledge
utilization at the institutional level. It has employed the theory developed by Haas of
‘epistemic communities’ and, in particular, that of Schreﬂer and her categories that
explain ‘knowledge utilization’. While their work does not address courts of law, it is
argued that it could be applied successfully and it thereby provides a rigorous
platform on which to present and test some of the data arising out of ﬁeldwork
gathered since 2014. Against this theoretical background it is suggested that the
NGT’s institutional form legitimizes sustainable environmental governance by
adopting reﬂexive practices.147 By offering ecological, technological and scientiﬁc
resource knowledge, the NGT experts either formulate policies or assist states with
the implementation of these policies, thereby adopting both a problem-solving and
policy-creation approach. The legitimacy not only includes the decision-making
process (accountability and transparency), but also refers to the process through
which the ‘environment and public interest’, as opposed to the ‘economic
development interest’, has an inﬂuence. The adoption of investigative and
stakeholder consultative procedures improves active participation through
dialogue, argument and norms for eliciting factual realities and expert knowledge
in order to respond to environmental problems. Nevertheless, the NGT’s scientiﬁc
experts and the use of their knowledge within a judicially controlled forum offers an
internalized, accountability-focused approach whereby a diverse set of actors such as
146 NGT Judgment, 19 May 2015. See also Sreeranganathan K.P. v. Union of India, n. 130 above;
Goa Paryavaran Savrakshan Sangharsh Samitee v. Sesa Goa, NGT Order, 20 Oct. 2014; Subhas
Datta v. State of West Bengal, NGT Order, 28 July 2015.
147 J. Voss & R. Kemp, ‘Sustainability and Reﬂexive Governance: Introduction’, in J. Voss,
D. Bauknecht & R. Kemp (eds), Reﬂexive Governance for Sustainable Development (Edward Elgar,
2006), pp. 3–28, at 4. Reﬂexive governance implies that ‘one calls into question the foundation of
governance itself, that is, the concepts, practices and institutions by which societal development is
governed, and that one envisions alternatives and reinvents and shapes those foundations’.
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governmental and local authorities, companies and multinational corporations are
restrained in compromising human welfare and the ecology.
The NGT is changing environmental jurisprudence in India. This is occurring not
simply through greater public access as a result of its wide deﬁnition of ‘aggrieved
party’. Initially it attracted litigants because of its speed in arriving at a decision. It is
enhancing public expectation through judgments and policy directions which clearly
reﬂect a commitment to its statutory obligation to decide cases according to the
principles of environmental sustainability. The composition of the bench and the
involvement of technical experts has introduced a new dimension into the decision-
making process. The legal lens has been expanded by the new and dramatically
different composition of the bench. Science has a profound effect upon our
understanding of and response to environmental issues. Science has a similar role
and effect within the NGT. Independent, in-house, scientiﬁc knowledge has become
part of the analysis that produces judicially binding decisions.
Nevertheless, there is evidence of growing turf wars between various interests and
institutions involved in environmental regulation and environmental jurisprudence.
The very success of the NGT, by its provision of decisions and enforceable remedies
to aggrieved persons throughout India, has resulted in expressions of anxiety focusing
on the powerful position achieved by the Tribunal within a relatively short period. It
remains to be seen if a Thucydides trap has been set. As discussed, albeit brieﬂy, the
growing power and success of the NGT has resulted in concerns being expressed by
powerful interests, speciﬁcally the MoEF,148 state governments (such as the Chief
Minister of Meghalaya149) and also the concerns of the High Court of Madras,
referred to above, regarding the use of the suo motu power.150 Additionally, critical
judgments have been made against the Central Ground Water Authority, Central
Pollution Control Board, and various state governmental authorities.151
The systematic review by the NGT resulting in critical judgments – which often
reﬂect the input of its scientiﬁc experts – has focused on economic interests and the
administration of several ministries, in particular the MoEF. As a consequence, legal
responses to these judgments have been in the form of appeals to the Supreme Court. By
way of example, the NGT Delhi bench imposed a ban on all diesel vehicles older than
10 years and prohibited vehicles over 15 years old from plying on the capital’s roads.
The response of Chief Justice H.L. Dattu to the appeal was: ‘One tribunal is trying to do
something which is good for people. Let us assist them and not discourage them.
148 See nn. 130–2 above.
149 The Chief Minister of Meghalaya, Mukul Sangma, urged Prime Minister Modi to allow the state
government to regulate the largely unregulated mining activities in view of the peculiar ground
conditions in the Hill state. This intervention was the result of a wave of protests against the NGT’s
ban on unscientiﬁc rat-hole mining in Meghalaya. Coal mining is a major source of livelihood for
people of the state and of revenue for the government. However, the NGT decided that the
unscientiﬁc, unlicensed and illegal coal mining affected water sources and the landscape, and overall it
degraded the ecology: Impulse NGO Network v. State of Meghalaya, Order, 9 June 2014.
150 N. 133 above.
151 Krishan Kant Singh v. M/s Hindustan Cocacola Beverages Ltd, NGT Order, 20 Jan. 2015;
Deshpande J. and N. Samiti v. State of Maharashta, NGT Judgment, 22 Apr. 2014; Tamankar S.N. v.
Union of India, NGT Judgment, 6 May 2014.
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We are not interfering with their order’.152 Subsequently, the Supreme Court upheld the
NGT order to limit the entry of tourist vehicles that did not have pollution certiﬁcates to
the glacial Rohtang Pass, known as the ‘Crown Jewel of Tourism in India’.153 In 2014
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the NGT to cancel an inadequately prepared
EIA. The result was that the proposed Aranmula International Airport in Kerala was
stalled.154
The MoEF has chosen to adopt a confrontational approach, based essentially on
exercising political power and budgetary restrictions, rather than follow the statutory
appeal procedure to the Supreme Court, where it has enjoyed little success. This
strategy has deﬁned its relationship with the NGT from its inception. Initially, the
Delhi bench of the NGT experienced a marked shortage of infrastructure, support
staff and basic amenities.155 Similar problems were experienced by the benches in
Bhopal, Pune and Kolkata. Ultimately, it required a direction to the government from
an apex bench of the Supreme Court of India to provide the NGT and its members
with appropriate accommodation and the status of High Court membership. The
apex bench members, Justice Singhvi and Justice Mukhopadhaya, required the
government to ensure ‘the effective functioning of the Tribunal by providing all
the facilities and amenities to the judicial members … the members of the NGT must
function with dignity’.156 The MoEF subsequently laid an afﬁdavit before the
Supreme Court stating, inter alia, that the NGT was not acting lawfully and had
caused the government ‘embarrassment’. The afﬁdavit produced a strong negative
reaction from the presiding judges, who described the claims as a ‘breach of all norms
of decency’ and the statements as ‘contemptuous’.157
The turf wars continue to the present time, as is demonstrated by the setting up by
MoEF of the Subramanian Committee to review the laws relating to the environment
and forest protection.158 Its recommendations to MoEF Minister, Prakash Javadekar,
include establishing special courts at district level to deal with infringements of
environmental law and an administrative (rather than judicial) tribunal to review
clearances. The chairman, T.S.R Subramanian, has stated that ‘the NGT cannot pick
152 ‘Supreme Court Upholds NGT Order Imposing Ban on 15-Year Old Vehicles in Delhi’, The Financial
Express, 20 Apr. 2015, available at: http://www.ﬁnancialexpress.com/article/economy/supreme-
court-upholds-ngt-order-imposing-ban-on-10-year-old-vehicles-in-delhi/65202.
153 ‘Vehicles Plying in Rohtang Pass: SC Refuses to Stay NGT Order’, The Economic Times, 26 May
2015, available at: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-05-26/news/62671601_1_taxi-
operators-ngt-rohtang-pass.
154 K. Rajagopal, ‘Supreme Court Clips Aranmula Airport’s Wings’, The Hindu, 22 Nov. 2014,
available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/supreme-court-clips-aranmula-airports-
wings/article6622930.ece.
155 K.S. Shrivastava, ‘Green Tribunal Gets Short Shrift’, Down to Earth, 30 June 2012, available at:
http://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/green-tribunal-gets-short-shrift-38426.
156 Supreme Court Order, 12 Sept. 2013.
157 ‘Green Tribunal Exceeding Its Brief: Govt to SC’, The Times of India, 13 Sept. 2013, available at:
http://timesoﬁndia.indiatimes.com/india/Green-tribunal-exceeding-its-brief-Govt-to-SC/articleshow/
22527436.cms.
158 ‘Report, High Level Committee to Review Various Acts Administered by Ministry of Environment,
Forest and Climate Change’, Nov. 2014, available at: http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/ﬁles/press-
releases/Final_Report_of_HLC.pdf.
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up cases suo motu’.159 Should this recommendation, currently before a Parliamentary
scrutiny committee, be accepted, it will seriously reduce the NGT’s powers to those
associated with a review body. As Lawyer 3 stated: ‘The whole idea of having
technical members of the NGT was to enable them to technically review project
clearances’.160 Yet, the very success of the Tribunal has brought with it signiﬁcant
external challenges concerning which institution ultimately shapes and controls
India’s environmental regulation and decision making.
This article has charted and analyzed the growth of a judicial body staffed by
technical experts and lawyers which functions not only as an adjudicatory body but
also moves its focus beyond the traditional, individualized legal issues and associated
common law remedies. Its ability to engage, produce and enforce scientiﬁcally
supported policy has taken its remit beyond the courtroom and into the wider
community. The NGT has impacted upon the country’s environmental jurisprudence,
has developed wide-ranging environmental policies, and exposed serious administrative
weaknesses. As in the UK, Indian senior judges tend to be self-referential in the exercise of
their decision-making powers rather than looking to the executive for directions.161
Nevertheless, powerful interests have expressed and demonstrated their concerns over the
role and status achieved by the NGT within a brief period. The future of the NGT is
uncertain and, in turn, raises questions about India’s environmental direction and its
progressive environmental jurisprudence.
159 M. Rajshekhar, ‘Will the TSR Panel Help India Manage Environment Better?’, The Economic Times,
8 Dec. 2014, available at: http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/Anomalocaris/will-the-tsr-
panel-help-india-manage-environment-better.
160 Interview, 12 Apr. 2015.
161 Paterson, n. 9 above.
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